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Abstract
This paper is written in order to study the effects which foreign direct investment firms have on 
developing host countries in order to find if countries' policies to actively attract FDI are a good 
development strategy. In order to find how FDI effects the countries are a big set of possible effects 
discussed and empirically tested using firm level data from 126 different developing countries. As 
such, the paper discusses the issue of the effectiveness of FDI attracting policies on an as broad and 
inclusive base as it finds possible. The result of doing this is it finds FDI firms, through being 
superior to domestic firms and thereby more efficient and increasing the wage level, do likely cause
an increase in economic growth in the less advanced economies; as a positive correlation between 
economic growth and FDI is also found. However, it is also shown FDI firms by competing out the 
domestic companies might have long run detrimental effects to the country's own industry. This, 
combined with the result showing effects likely differ depending on the country, shows caution 
needs to be taken in implementing FDI attracting policies. As such, the developing countries which 
do implement FDI attracting policies are likely to get positive effects of doing so but should watch 
out or they might in the end end up being worse off. 
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I. Introduction
An increased interest among firms to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) can be seen in the 
rapid pace with which FDI increase, something which was noted already in 1993 when it had tripled
since the mid 80' (Froot, 1993). The great increase in FDI in this period is possible to confirm with 
data from UNCTAD (2015) when adjusting for inflation using CPI based inflation data (Bureau of 
Labour Statistics, 2015). The data also shows FDI in the mid 80's was down below 0.5% of world 
GDP and grew to become 0.9% of world GDP in 1993. The data also shows the world FDI 
increased further with more than six times the amount between Froot's observations in 1993 until 
2007, at which point it was up in 4% of world GDP, after which it has declined slightly likely due to
the crisis. Further, the data makes it is clear a lot of the FDI in the world goes from developed 
countries to developing countries, even though FDI seem to also occur between developed countries
and possibly also between developing countries. This is to an extent where countries in Eastern 
Africa, South-East Asia, and Latin America receive over 5% of their annual GDP as FDI and in 
many developing countries has FDI become the dominant source of funding (Calderón & al., 2004).
Thus, it is important to study what the effects of FDI on the host country is as the effects are likely 
to increase with the increasing streams of FDI and as the host country's which likely get the most 
effected is the less developed countries in the world. 
The reason why firms engage in FDI, and thereby become multinational enterprises (MNE), 
has been a hot topic since the 1960's (Velde, 2006). Further, one of the earliest still relevant 
theories; the OLI framework; was proposed by Dunning already in the 1970's (Neary, 2008). What 
the theories of firms decisions to engage in FDI (Brainard, 1997; Helpman & al, 2004; Neary, 2008)
have in common is the idea of firms engaging in FDI due to it being beneficial for them; which 
likely is the reason due to basic economics. It would be beneficial either through the host country 
being a beneficial site of production even though not the intended market, so called vertical FDI, or 
as an alternative to exports due to benefits of being close to the market, so called horizontal FDI. 
These reasons are all regarding the self-interest of the firm and risks of the FDI firms crowding out 
the domestic market and causing damage seems to exist, which has caused outcries calling the 
MNEs “neo-collonial” (Vidal, 2009; Grammaticas, 2012). Nonetheless, policies in developing 
countries in order to attract FDI are by now common and started to come into place since the 
1990's, which means this form of “neo-collonialism” seem to be welcomed and wanted by the host 
country and might even have positive effects for the host country, even though the firms engaging in
it do it due to it being preferable for them. The FDI attracting policies are in many cases in the form 
of special economic zones (SEZ) which are areas of a country in which different trade and tax 
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policies apply in order to accommodate trade and exports. The SEZs have been arranged all across 
the developing and newly industrialized countries which famous examples existing in China and the
most recent examples existing across the African continent (Farole & Akinci, 2011; Woolfrey, 
2013). However, what the benefits or potential harms to developing of them attracting FDI are is 
still generally unclear. Hence, a study of the effects of inward FDI to a developing country is 
important to understand the future of economic development in the world and to evaluate if what 
these weak economies are doing is beneficial for their people.
The point of this paper is to make a broad study of the possible effects which FDI can have 
on developing host countries, as to understand if it is positive to attract FDI. Plenty of studies have 
been done in the past but all of which have focused on just one or two aspects, despite the papers 
finding a series of aspects exists. Hence, what the paper will add to current research is a combined 
study of a great extent of effects to get a bigger picture. Further, existing papers generally focus on 
just one or in some cases a few countries in order to find detailed results for how the chosen effect 
of study effects the chosen country on a more detailed level and it is not uncommon to use 
agglomerated data for the research. This paper will differ in its use of an international data set, from
which 126 different developing countries will be included in the analysis, which has data on a firm 
level. Hence, the paper will attempt to bring together a huge set of possible effects FDI can have on 
developing countries on a global scale by studying how FDI affects the firms of the country.
This paper will mainly focus on horizontal FDI, despite vertical FDI likely having effects as 
well. This is since horizontal FDI firms produce their main product, which they are most specialist 
in, in the host country and since horizontal FDI firms are more likely to be more engaged in the 
country as they produce for the country's market and not just to ship their products out of there. 
Further, it is also because firms who only are in a foreign country to produce exports for other 
markets are likely doing more short term planing and generally not behaving like normal firms sine 
they due to the nature would move if a country with better opportunities came about. However, only
firms who solely export will be excluded as all firms who at least partly engage on the host 
country's market can be thought of as roughly equal in terms of engagement since they all are 
somewhat tied to the market. Similarly, only less advanced economies will be used as host countries
as advanced economies seem to exchange FDI with each other while less advanced economies in an
other way have a one way inward stream of FDI. As such, the less advanced host countries for FDI 
differ from the advanced and are more interesting for this study from a development perspective. As
such, there are certain limitations on what FDI and what host countries will be considered in this 
paper.
In the following chapters will the possible benefits and harms of FDI be theoretically and 
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empirically discussed from the aspect of the host country as to find whether FDI can be a big help 
in the development in less developed countries. In chapter II will economic theory and a literature 
review be used to find a bigger group of sub-hypotheses to in a systematic way discuss and test 
different possible ways through which FDI can affect a country. Chapter III will contain an analysis 
of the data which will be used in chapter IV to test sub-hypotheses empirically. Chapter V will be 
used to combine the result from all sub-hypotheses theoretical and empirical part to answer the 
main question, what are the total effects of FDI on a host country. Finally, chapter VI will conclude 
the paper.
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis
Since FDI investments are growing internationally and an increasing amount of countries change 
their policy in order to attract FDI is the paper's main hypothesis
• FDI do have primarily positive effects on the developing host country. 
However, in order to test and discuss this hypothesis in more detail will a review of previous work 
be conducted to find which effects FDI are likely to have on the host country. The debate regarding 
what the host country earn or loses on attracting FDI did take off in the 1960's and which is at the 
same time as research on why firms would engage in FDI at all (Velde, 2006). However, in 
difference from the multitude of theories regarding why firms do engage in FDI are there no 
generally recognized economic theories regarding what the effects of FDI are on the host country, 
instead there are big set of separate hypothesis which have been tested empirically in a great amount
of papers. Hence, the literature review will instead of a look at theories consists of a summary of 
mainly randomly chosen peer-reviewed papers who have commented and done empirical work 
upon the topic of the effects of FDI. The positive effects can come either from the bigger and more 
efficient FDI firms; which they are likely to be since it is the most efficient firms that engage in FDI
(Heplman & al, 2004); benefiting the host country by their presence or through the FDI firms 
having spillover effects on domestic firms.
FDI can cause production and innovation improvements in the host country by setting an 
example and by spreading technology through better processes and superior physical capital, in a 
way which they could not do if they werent present in the country, and by this induce economic 
growth (Johnson, 2006). This can be done through either reverse engineering or through a 
demonstration effect. In the case of export can the product itself be reverse engineering, while FDI 
by being present on the market makes reverse engineering of the production process itself possible. 
The demonstration effect works in a similar way by inspiring firms which operates in the vicinity of
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the more efficient FDI firm, in accordance with the theory of agglomeration externalities (Jacobs, 
1969). FDI firms has been shown to work as examples for domestic firms and as sources of modern 
technology for example using data from 1980-2002 over Swedish MNEs (Johnson, 2006) and data 
from 1995-2000 in China (Cheung & Lin, 2004). Further, if the FDI firms themeselves are more 
productive, as they in all studies above have been shown to be, does this mean a more efficient use 
of the means of production of the country which also should contribute to an increased growth 
through increased production.
Foreign firms are likely to pay higher wages than domestic firms, in order to attract the top 
workers, which both spillover into an overall higher wage level in the economy and which under the
assumption of consumption lead growth would cause economic growth and therefore a higher 
welfare for the country. This has been shown to be the case, for example using 1996 data from 
Indonesia (Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004).
The employees of a firm get trained both through practical knowledge from working in the 
firm as well as from employee education programs. Since, the foreign firms are assumed to be more
efficient than the domestic firms would experience from them increase the employees knowledge 
and productivity more than in domestic firms. This part can be tested more directly by comparing 
how much foreign firms spend on employee education compared to domestic firms. FDI's ability to 
cause a more educated work force has been shown in terms of labor productivity with 1990-1995 
Indonesian data (Takii, 2005) as well as in terms of skill labor turnover with 1995-2000 Chinese 
data (Cheung & Lin, 2004).
There are papers suggesting FDI can contribute to increased research and development 
(R&D) in the country both by bringing their own R&D and by encouraging domestic firms to 
engage in R&D as well. Papers finding this to be the case have used 1995-2000 (Cheung & Lin, 
2004) as well as 1998-2003 Chinese data (Guoming & Bing, 2005). Thus, studied previous papers 
have unfortunately just showing this to be the case in China. However, if the firm decides to engage
in FDI is that not the full story regarding R&D as the firm can either decide to start up their own 
enterprises in the new country, greenfield FDI, or by buying themselves into existing domestic firms
through merging and acquisitions (M&A). This is relevant since a study done on data from 1970-
1998 over Swedish MNEs show there is a between M&A establishments and greenfield 
establishments, by the M&A establishments investing more in R&D than what the greenfield do. 
(Bertrand & al., 2007) However, the data set which will be used include no data regarding 
greenfield or M&A and this must therefore be dropped from the hypothesis despite being 
interesting.
Similar to the crowd-out effect caused by government investment can foreign firms crowd 
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out domestic investment by fierce competition, not only on the goods market but also on the labor 
market and other resource markets. This is not per se a negative effect in the short run since it do 
mean less productive firms are replaced with more efficient foreign firms, given the profits stay in 
the host country. However, this could be negative if the foreigners sent the profits back to their 
country of origin. Further, in the long run is this negative for the country in a case where the FDI is 
retracted since this means the domestic firms would in such case be left with only underdeveloped 
firms. Both in a paper using 1971-2000 data from 36 countries; 12 African, 12 Asian, and 12 Latin 
American; (Agosin & Machado, 2005) and in a paper using 1983-1999 data from China (Liuyong &
Guoliang, 2002) has this been shown to possibly be the case. Therefore, it is clear there are not only
upsides for the host country in attracting FDI.
A further possible effect not found in any already publish papers is FDI firms ability to 
increase gender equality in the host country. This idea is supported by a UNDP (2013) report 
ranking countries according to a gender inequality index, which shows the advanced economies; 
which are generally the economies investing in FDI (UNCTAD, 2015); have clearly higher levels of
gender equality than the poorer nations which in this paper are measured as the receivers of FDI. 
Hence, under the assumption the firms from the advanced economies bring with them the views on 
gender equality which exists in their home countries will the FDI firm by their presence raise the 
gender equality in the host country and hopefully also cause spillovers to domestic firms.
In total are six channels through which FDI can affect a host country identified, even though
more channels do likely exist. Of the six are five effects positive for the host country; the exception 
being the crowd-out effect; which can explain why many papers have found FDI spurs growth. 
Hence, it seems to be positive for a country to have high levels of FDI and therefore would policies 
which can increase FDI, such as those implemented around the world, possibly help developing 
countries grow. Hence, the main hypotheis of FDI primarily having positive effects finds empiric 
support.
The six channels through which FDI can effect the host country are in themselves not 
sub-hypotheses but inspire the creation of two sets of sub-hypotheses, one regarding the superiority 
of the FDI firms over domestic firms and one regarding these superior firms spillovers on domestic 
firms; by making domestic frims improve. As such, the first set based upon the six channels are:
• FDI firms have superior technology usage compared to domestic firms.
• FDI firms pay higher wages than domestic firms.
• FDI firms spend more on labor education than domestic firms.
• FDI firms spend more on R&D than domestic firms.
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• FDI firms are a greater competitor to domestic firms than what domestic firms are to FDI 
firms.
• FDI firms run more gender balanced operations than domestic firms.
These all are straight forward in testing since they can be confirmed or rejected through comparing 
firms of different ownership, after first controlling for things like size and age.
Even though most papers do find FDI firms to be superior to domestic firms are spillovers 
not a given since they do depend upon how susceptible the domestic firms are to the FDI firms, 
which likely can be part of why some papers find a well developed financial market to be important 
(Azman-Saini & al., 2010). Further, even though most papers agree on the existence of spillover 
effects do some papers find empirical evidence contradicting this all together (Vahter & Masso, 
2006). Hence, it is a point to testing spillover effects separately in order to see not just what FDI 
firms bring to the host country but also how the FDI firms effect the domestic firms. Based on the 
six sub-hypothesis in the first set can therefore a second set of spillover related sub-hypothesis be 
stated, all linked to one of the sub hypothesis in the first set. This since all spillovers work under the
assumption the FDI firm is more efficient and as such can through inspiration and competition 
improve the domestic firms. These are:
• Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI use better technology due to spillover.
• Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI pay higher wages due to spillover.
• Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI spend more on educating their labor 
force due to spillover.
• Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI spend more on R&D due to spillover.
• Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI have a harder time on the input and 
final goods markets due to crowding-out competition.
• Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI have more gender equal operations 
due to spillover.
These are not as easy to test since the data set contains cross-sectional data without any real panel 
data aspect. As such, what will be found is a correlation but causation will be hard to assert. Further,
issues of endogeneity can occur. However, given the size of the data set can a clear correlation 
hopefully still be found.
Finally, if the above hypotheses hold true and the main hypothesis; that FDI primarily have 
positive effects on the host country; also holds true should a country with higher levels of inward 
FDI experience higher growth. Overall, the papers finding a positive effects of FDI do also find FDI
helps induce growth in the developing countries it occurs in; exempli gratia (Cheung & Lin, 2004), 
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(Damijan & al., 2008), and (Johnson, 2006). However, there are papers suggesting a well developed
financial market is needed for this growth benefit of FDI to occur (Azman-Saini & al., 2010), other 
papers gets results showing the size of the effects; thus including the growth effect; differ between 
firms and between countries based on their ability to absorb the effects (Damijan & al., 2008), and 
finally as previously state some papers do not find any effects at all (Vahter & Masso, 2006). As 
such, it is relevant to in the end look into whether there is a correlation between inward FDI and 
economic growth in the developing host countries, as this over arches all the hypothesis and since it 
is unclear whether this is the case. Hence, the final hypothesis is:
• Countries with higher levels of FDI do experience higher levels of economic growth.
However, this hypothesis cannot be tested with the main data set as it is not on a firm level and a 
second data set will instead be used for this hypothesis, a data set which enables panel data analysis.
With the growth hypothesis, two sets of six sup-hypotheses each which are linked
one-and-one between the sets are found as well as an over-arching final sub-hypothesis. All these 
will be tested, set by set separately, and discussed in order to find the effects for the host country of 
attracting FDI and thereby answering the main hypothesis.
III. Data Analysis
Data for the empirical testing will primarily be picked from  the World Bank Enterprise Survies 
(World Bank, 2015a) but data will also come from the World Bank World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2015b). The first of them; The World Bank Enterprise Survey; contains survey data 
collected on a firm level in different locations and at different times while the second; The World 
Bank World Development Indicators; contains agglomerated national data from 1960 and forward.
III.I. World Bank Enterprise Survey
For the Enterprise Survey has two standardized survies been used, one between 2002 and 
2006 and one from 2006 onward. The 34 countries which were surived in 2006 were survied in both
the old and the new system; except seven countries which only were survied in the old system, one 
country which was only survied in the new system, and Namibia for which two-thirds were only 
survied in the new system; and for them was the old survey data deleted in order to avoid duplicate 
data. The differences between the two survey systems lies mainly in the formulation and amount of 
questions asked, with it seeming like the new system implemented to make up for data lacking in 
the old system. A further difference is the way values are reported, the biggest difference being the 
old system reporting missing data as a dot while the new system to a certain extent report missing 
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data as negative numbers which has to be kept in mind and converting all negative numbers to dots 
is necessary to not end up with faulty data.
As of April 2015 does data exist from 147 states; whereof Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo 
are registered as one and separately, id est totally four countries, due to the recent independence of 
the three from each other. Further, a total of 323 survies have been conducted containing totally 
about 170'000 firms, meaning the average country has been survied more than twice since the first 
set of survies were published in 2002 and there are on average more than 500 firms per survey. Of 
which Bulgaria have been survied six times and 45 countries have only been survied once; and of 
which the biggest survey, India 2014, contains 9281 firms and the smallest survey, Micronesia 
2009, only contains 68 firms. The countries for which data exists are shown in Illustration 1; 
including eleven Carribean states, Cabo Verde, The Gambia, Djibouti, Mauritius, and five Pacific 
states which are in the illustration but due to their small size are not visible. All survies are 
regarding what the situation was in the survied establishment in he latest finish fiscal year, id est the
year before the survey was conducted.
Since the host countries considered are the developing countries will the more advanced 
economies have to removed from the data set. Using the list of advanced economies which is 
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Illustration 1: The countries for which data exists
Created with the use of: amcharts.com/visited_countries
published by the International Monetary Fund (2015) in their annual publication World Economic 
Outlook are a few of the countries in the data set found to be advanced and should therefore be 
excluded. The economies to be excluded are the Euro Area economies, except Latvia; Sweden; 
Czech Republic; Israel; and the Republic of Korea. However, an exception will be done for Croatia 
as it joined the list first in 2013, as it became a part of the Euro Area and as it had not been an 
advanced economy before (IMF, 2013), and the latest data it has in the data set is regarding 2012 
and thereby is there no conflict in including it. Further, due to the common market limiting the 
countries of the European Union, a union in which most countries are on the list of advanced 
economies, from setting their own FDI related policies and inability to in any way control their 
inflow of FDI will all the remaining European Union members be excluded as well in order for the 
union to not affect the result. Furthermore, the territory West Band and Gaza will also be excluded 
since the data do not specify whether Israeli firms are seen as foreign or domestic in these areas, 
which means the territories might be included in the list of advanced economies. Hence, 129 
countries, spread out over 269 surveies, containing about 150'000 firms remain to be used in the 
empirical work of this paper.
The survey contains some different country specific questions, however the big mass of 
questions are part of the new or the old standardized questionnaire; which of the two depends on 
whether the survey was taken before or after 2006. Therefore, the two standardized data sets will be
used in this paper to limit the amount of possible data and therefore limit the possible errors. 
However, the two standardized questionnaires got a lot in common even though the old 
questionnaire data set only contains 541 variables while the new contains 952, meaning the data 
from the older data set might be excluded from some parts of the empirical testing; which is not a 
great problem since of the remaining data are 45 thousand observations in the old data set and 103 
thousand in the new so the new data set is the more important.
In order to determine whether an establishment is part of an FDI firm or a domestic firm do 
both systems have a question regarding ownership; “what percentage of this firm is owned by:”1; 
which has the alternatives private domestic, private foreign, government, and other. From this will 
all private foreign be seen as the only FDI firms even though the category government might 
include foreign governments. Hence, in cases where there is insufficient or incorrect data; id est the 
sum of the values do not add up to 100%; in regard to the question will the firm have to be dropped.
Further, all firms which are partially registered as “other” will be dropped as well due to the 
insecurity of what their ownership status really is. In the old system do 333 firms from different 
survies have insufficient data and of the remaining are 857 partly owned by “other”. Thus, a total of
1 Question  3 in the old questionnaire and question B2 in the new questionnaire.
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1190 are therefore deleted; of which no full survey has insufficient data. From the new survey data 
set are 1891 firms lacking data on the topic and of the remaining are 2570 firms partially owned by 
“other”. Therefore, a total of 4461 firms have to be deleted; in this case did all 500 firms from the 
survey Venezuela 2006 get deleted.
In order to determine whether a FDI firm engages in horizontal FDI at all; id est the FDI 
products are at least partially sold in the host country's market; is there question in each survey 
regarding what percentage of sales are sold domestically, what percentage is sold as indirect 
exports, and what percentage are sold as direct exports2. From this will all domestic sales be seen as
horizontal FDI as they would otherwise have to be imported or not entered the market at all. Thus, 
as in the case of determine ownership will all firms with insufficient or incorrect data have to be 
removed; id est all firms for which the three do not sum to 100%. In the old data set are 1201 firms 
removed due to lacking this data. From the new data set are 918 firms dropped due to lacking data. 
From the two systems are no survey affected in particular by this removal. 
The private owned and government owned will be used as benchmarks to compare the FDI 
firm and are therefore useful for the paper. However, as the paper will mainly focus at the behavior 
of horizontal FDI firms will all FDI firms, for now defined as any firm owned at least partly by a 
foreign private owner, who have 0% of their sales in the host country be excluded. Since they in 
such a case are not even partly engaging in the market of the host country and therefore is it 
questionable to which extent they can effect the domestic firms. Further, if a survey has not a single 
firm with any foreign ownership left after this removal are the whole survey removed since it then 
give no useful data. In the old data set are 1084 of the 5327 partially or fully foreign owned firms 
not selling anything on the domestic market and are therefore uninteresting for this paper; of which 
no survey had all its data deletedbut firms in South East Asia were over-represented. However, the 
old data set did contain one survey, Peru 2002, which after this contained 41 firms whereof none 
was a FDI firms and therefore was the survey removed. From the new data set did this cause the 
deletion of 927 of the 9914 remaining FDI firms; whereof South East Asia once again was over-
represented. However, the new data set contain three survies; Afghanistan 2014 with 371 firms, 
Azerbaijan 2013 with 390 firms, and Kosovo 2009 with 258 firms; which after all removals contain 
no FDI firms and where therefore deleted. 
Of the remaining firms are 13'230 partially or fully foreign owned, 4697 are fully foreign 
owned, and of the fully foreign owned firms are 3883 only selling their products on the domestic 
market. However, this means many of the remaining FDI firms are just partially foreign owned. The
firms which only have a partial foreign ownership will either be classified as fully foreign or 
2 Question 11 in the old questionnaire and question D3 in the new questionnaire
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removed depending on whether the control of the firm is foreign, id est if the foreign owners have 
50% of the ownership or more. The reason for this is since firms who are FDI owned but not 
controlled have an unknown degree of foreign involvement. Doing this removes 1036 firms from 
the old data set and 1915 firms from the new data set. However, it also leaves the survey Kosovo 
2013 without any FDI firms and its 199 firms are therefore removed.
Remaining in the end are 128 countries; since both Kosovo survies were lacking FDI firms; 
spread over 263 survies; still roughly two survies per country; containing a total of about 134'000 
firms; still about 500 firms per survey. Of this are 10'279 firms foreign controlled, which is more 
than 39 firms per survey, which means each survey contains about 460 control firms which are 
either private domestic or public owned. Hence, there is a big enough set of firms remaining to 
conduct meaningful empirical studies of the two sub-hypotheses which is combined into one big 
data set. 
III.II. World Bank World Development Indicators
In the World Development Indicators (WDI) is there different kinds of agglomerated national data 
from 1960 and forward for 214 countries and territories. The data from here which will be used in 
empirical testing of the sub-hypotheses is most importantly the data concerning FDI net inflows in 
percentage of GDP as well as in total numbers, which will be used in the empirical testing of the 
spillover hypothesis as well as the growth hypothesis. Additional data, growth data and a few 
control variables, will also be picked from this source for the testing of the growth hypothesis. The 
issue of using this data is it will not enable a study on the behavior, conditions, and attitudes of 
firms; as the other data set can; but the benefit is it will provide a greater time dimension through 
being proper panel data. The data which will be used is from 2000-2013 and only for the 128 
countries which are remaining in the Enterprise Survey data. However, also Serbia and Montenegro 
will be dropped from the survey data, as it does not exist in the WDI, resulting in 127 countries 
remaining in both data sets.
IV. Empirical Testing
The empirical testing will be conducted using cross-sectional analysis for the two first sets but with 
an element of panel data analysis in the second set and with pure panel data for the growth 
hypothesis. This is since in the survey data are only 78 of the 128 included countries being survied 
more than one year; 40 countries are survied twice, 22 countries are survied thrice, 10 countries are 
survied four times, and a mere 5 countries are even survied five times; which do make it hard to 
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include any greater time aspect for most countries. Further, it is unclear to what extent it is the same
firms survied in the countries survied more than one year since the survey is anonymous.
For the first set of sub-hypotheses; regarding the superiority of FDI firms; must domestic 
private and public firms be used as a benchmark toward which the FDI firms will be compared. 
Similarly, for the second set of sub-hypothesis; regarding spillover effects; will only data from 
private domestic firms be used. Hence, three groups need to be created as dummies depending upon
firm ownership: one for the more than 10'000 FDI firms; defined as all firms who are at least 50% 
foreign owned; one for the more than 3'000 public domestic owned; defined as all firms who are at 
least 50% public owned given it is not already defined as an FDI firm; and one for the more than 
120'000 private domestic firms; defined as all firms who are more than 50% private domestic 
owned. Hence, all firms are registered in only one of the three categories and the reason for 
prioritizing FDI and secondarily prioritizing public firms is due countries which actively try to 
attract foreign firms likely let them lead the firm if FDI/public owned and because both foreign and 
public owners likely have more power than private domestic firms in the cases with 50/50 
ownership. Further, of 50/50 owned firms were only 80 firms owned public/private domestic, 21 
firms public/FDI, and 979 firms FDI/private domestic; as such is this unlikely to skew the data to 
any greater extent. Also, cases with triple split ownership did not exist in the data set at all. In sum, 
the quality of the FDI firms will be possible to test by dummy variable analysis in a comparison 
between different survies respectively in comparison with dummies for two other kinds of firms 
while the spillovers will be possible to estimate by isolating the private domestic firms.
IV.I. Discussion of Variable Measurement
The measures of the hypothesis specific data; even though they for set one will be used as 
dependent variables and for set two as independent variables; are the same for both the two big sets 
of sub-hypothesis within each connected pair of hypotheses, with the exception of the competition 
hypotheses. However, the sub-hypothesis regarding the connection between inward FDI and growth
is measured differently and will be discussed later. These hypothesis specific measurements of data 
are:
• Firm technology is measured in whether the firms uses e-mail and website in contact with 
suppliers and costumers3 and how high their revenue is per employee; calculated by dividing
the revenue4 with the amount of employees after converting the revenue values to 2005 US$ 
3 Question 24 in the old questionnaire and question C22 in the new questionnaire.
4 Question 74a1y in the old questionnaire and question D2 in the new questionnaire
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to have it all in the same units5. The issue with employee numbers are there exists both 
permanent employees and temporary employees, which means three separate revenue per 
employee measures will be created: one using only permanent employees6; in the result 
tables refered to as (1); one using all employees7 (2), and one using all employees but 
weighing the temporary employees by how many months they on average are employed8 
(3). In the calculation of the three employment measures were data from firms claiming to 
have no employees removed and all weights over one year temporary employment as if it 
was one year. Hence, a total of five measurements is used for these two hypotheses.
• Wages are, due to a lack of data in many questions, measured based on the total cost of labor
which includes “wages, salaries, bonuses, social payments”, “[a]llowances, [...] and other 
benefits”t9. In order to calculate wages will this measure be divided  by the amount of 
workers, using the same three methods of calculating workers as for the previous hypothesis
specific variables, resulting in a total of three closely linked measures for these two sub-
hypotheses.
• Education of the labor force is hard to survey due to varying quality and format, thus the 
data which exists and will be used is data regarding whether if formal “off the job” training 
programs exists10. The reason why this is used instead of existing survey measures regarding
percentage receiving training is due to the relative lack of data and higher degree of 
uncertainty in the percentage data. Thus, only one measurement exists for these two 
hypotheses.  
• R&D expenditure is measured by whether the firm during the last three years have 
undertaken the development of a new production line, upgrading of an existing line, and the 
introduction of new substantial technology; for which data only exists for firms in the old 
data set11; and how much the firm in the past year spent on R&D; for which data also only 
exists for firms in the old data set12. Thus, four variables exists for these two hypotheses. 
However, all four only cover a small section of the total amount of surveies, but the covered 
survies are well covered.
• Firms level of competition is measured in share of the local market and of the national 
5 The old data set have data in thousands while the new data set has data in singles, which also is taken care off. The 
convertion is done using exchange rate data (World Bank, 2015b).
6 Question 62a1y in the old questionnaire and question L1 in the new questionnaire.
7 Temporary employees are in question 63a1y in the old questionnaire and question L6 in the new questionnaire.
8 Question 63c1y in the old questionnaire and question L8 in the new questionnaire.
9 Question 74j1y in the old questionnaire and question N2a in the new questionnaire. NB, the old questionnaire 
report values in thousands and the new report in singles.
10 Question 67a in the old questionnaire and question L10 in the new questionnaire.
11 Question 58 in the old questionnaire.
12 Question 80 in the old questionnaire.
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market; for which data only exists for firms in the old data set13; in whether the firm has sees
its technology as inferior or superior; also limited to the old data set14; the average education
of a typical production worker; which is calculated differently in the two data sets thus will 
be used as two different measures in the regression15; and in how big obstacle access to good
labor16 and access to land is17. Hence, there exists five measures for this couple sub-
hypotheses, whereof the five three have limited data. However, only the last two; regarding 
access to resources; are applicable for the group two sub-hypothesis.
• Gender equality within the firm is measured in percentage of senior management is female18 
the percentage of total workers, management, professional workers, skilled-production 
workers, unskilled-production workers, and non-production permanent workers who are 
female19; whereof all only exist in the old data set. The variables is also measured by 
whether any owners are female20 and the percentage of production and non-production 
permanent full-time workers who are female21; whereof all only exist in the new data set. As 
such, a total of ten measure exists for this variable, but not a single of them exists for all 
survies which is a restriction on the regressions.
As such, all six sub-hypothesis in the two sets; which means twelve of the totally thirteen suggested 
hypothesis; are possible to measure; using the data from the enterprise survies. All but two are 
possible to measure in more than one way, the benefit of which is more measures provides different 
angels of the same hypothesis and as such all possible measures were chosen. However, the 
different measures will be used in separate regression after which the combined result will be used 
to discuss whether the hypothesis should be rejected.
All the measures have their observation amounts, ranges, means, and standard deviations, as 
well as description of what their values stand for described in further detail in Appendix Table 1. In 
it is it clear the measures are skewed differently and have different amount of observations, 
meaning their results are likely to differ in uncertainty. 
Upon running a preliminary regression; using the first set of sub-hypotheses' OLS regression
shown later in equation 1 and giving the result of which is shown in Appendix Table 2; was an issue
found with some values producing poor results. Looking at the details of each measure, as shown in 
13 Question 10 in the old questionnaire.
14 Question 56 in the old questionnaire.
15 Question 70 in the old questionnaire and question L9 in he new questionnaire.
16 Question 18I in the old questionnaire and question L30b in the new questionnaire.
17 Question 18D in the old questionnaire and question G30a in the new questionnaire.
18 Question 72 in the old questionnaire.
19 Question 62 in the old questionnaire.
20 Question B4 in the new questionnaire.
21 Calculatable by using question L5 and question L3 in the new questionnaire.
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Appendix Table 1, was a possible issue with outliers found. The issue of outliers exists for all the 
productivity measures, wage measures, and the R&D expenditure measure, which all have a big 
mass of low values and then a skew toward higher values with major gaps to the top firms and 
which likely is the reason why these measures five nonsensical results. The cause of this outliers is 
not due to an error in a specific survey or an issue with converting from local currency to 2005 US$ 
as the extreme firms are generally spread over countries and over years. However, the cause can 
either be extremely great firms which simply behave differently from all other firms or just 
misreported information. Since the aim of these survey is not to study these effects in detail and 
discuss why the outliers might exist is the data quickly adjusted so these handfull of firms will not 
cause out of proportion results; apart from removing all firms reporting no sales and all firms 
reporting no wages since no sales and no wages do not make sense; by setting the top 1% of firms 
for each measure to unknown. These measures have between over 100'000 and over 22'000 firms 
and as such removing 1% is not doing severe harm to the credibility of the data. Hence, all these 
seven measures still have values skewed toward higher values but now without any major gaps.
All six hypotheses couples therefore got a series of possible measures which will be used. 
All measures got sufficient with data, the least existing measure containing 6'677 observations, and 
after cutting outliers from seven of the measures is the spread of all measures in a way which is 
makes reliable regressions possible; for further details see the preliminary results in the Appendix 
Table 2.
IV.II. Control Variables
The two big sets of sub-hypothesis will include the same control variables in their regressions. The 
regression regarding the growth hypothesis on the other hand have a separate set of control 
variables which will be discussed later. These seven control variables for the two sets, based upon 
what has been suggested in the papers in the theoretical part of this paper, are:
• Industry of the firm, since the effects likely depend upon the industry of production since 
different industries act under different conditions. Data for this exists on a separate sheet in 
the old questionnaire set but is incorporated in the new questionnaire, as it is question A4. In
both data sets is the industry classified based upon the World Bank's own system consisting 
of a total of 26 different categories, including “other unclassified”.
• Legal status of the firm, since in most countries do different rules apply to firms of different 
legal status and therefore are they meeting different conditions22. A total of 7 different legal 
statuses are included in the questions, including “other”, and it ranges from sole 
22 Question 2 in the old questionnaire and question B1 in the new questionnaire.
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proprietorship to publicly listed company but with a slight issue of not having same names 
in the two questionnaires.
• Size of the firm, as a bigger firm can spend more, have bigger competitive power, and can 
take greater liberties. This is measured partly in annual sales23 and it is also measured in the 
weighted measure of employment numbers which is calculated in the same way as for the 
hypothesis specific measurement of data regarding firm productivity.
• Age of the firm in relation to the country in question, since older firms have had longer time 
to establish themselves on the market. Data for this is possible to calculate based on the year
of foundation24. However, it is unclear if the firm has changed owner since it was founded 
which is a limitation to this data.
• The skills of the top manager, since a better manager can make a firm perform better 
independent of the ownership of the firm. This is estimated by the number of years of 
experience the top manager have with working in the sector the firm operates within25.
• Country the firm operates in, since different countries have different opportunities and 
different possibilities for the firms due to location and due to politics. This is measured in 
the reported country of the survey and as such implemented through country dummies.
• Year the survey is regarding, since different years means different settings, economies, and 
slightly different survies. This is measured as the year before the survey was conducted, in 
accordance with what says in the survey.
There was also a possible eight and ninth control variable regarding whether the firm had been 
previously public owned and whether how big the firm was upon start-up. However, both these 
were shown to be poor fits as control variables as they had very limited data. In contrast, all 
included control variables contain data for over 100'000 firms; for further details see Appendix 
Table 1.
When the preliminary regression, result of which is shown in Appendix Table 2, was run did 
these seven control variables all seem to be relevant. However, there is an issue with high levels of 
uncertainties in the result which causes inconclusive results in many cases. A likely cause of the 
high levels uncertainty is the vast amount of control variables; given it is one for each of the 127 
countries, each of the 12 years, each of the 26 industries, and each of the 7 legal statuses. Hence, 
there is a need to simplify the measures of these four control variables compared to how they are 
measured above. 
23 Question 74a1y in the old questionnaire and question D2 in the new questionnaire. NB the old questionnaire has 
data in thousands while the new questionnaire has data in singles.
24 Question 1 in the old questionnaire and question B5 in the new questionnaire.
25 Question 73 in the old questionnaire and question B7 in the new questionnaire.
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• The 127 country variables can be simplified into 16 location variables in which countries in 
the same region is grouped together; which works under the assumptions of countries in the 
same locality in general having similar political policies, culture, and economic situation. 
This is done by grouping the countries based upon the United Nations Statistics Divisions' 
(2013) way of dividing the world; but changing Mexico to a Central American country as 
well as making one group out of Micronesia, Polynesia, and Melanesia called Oceania in 
order to leave no country alone. 
• The 12 year variables can be simplified into one variable based upon whether the data is 
from the old data set or the new data set, since this both catch issues caused by the 
differences between the two standardized survies but also since the switch between the two; 
which came in 2006; almost coincides with the 2007 economic crisis and as such shows two 
generally different situations in the world economy. 
• The 26 industries can; based upon ISIC Rev. 4 (UNSD, 2008); be reduced to four by 
combining ISIC category A to F; which is different kind of primary and secondary 
production; into one, keeping ISIC category G on its own; as it is retail which is the biggest 
category in the data; and by combining ISIC category H to S; which are different kind of 
services; into one.
• The 7 legal statuses can be reduced to 4 by putting cooperatives, limited partnerships, and 
partnerships in the same category; as they are similar in structure; and by classifying the 
smallest group; publicly listed companies; as “other”. 
As such, the regressions will instead of 172 control dummy variables only include 25 control 
dummy variables. The slimming of the amount of control variables in the regression hopefully gives
better results without lowering the quality of the control variables. Further problems have been 
extreme outliers in employment numbers, which was corrected by cutting the top 1%, and some 
managers reporting experiences in the field being as long as over two millennium, solved by setting 
all manager experience on 100 years or more to unknown.
IV.III. Empirical Testing of Set One: The Superiority of the FDI Firms
The first set of sub-hypothesis included a total of six sub-hypothesis:
• FDI firms have superior technology usage compared to domestic firms.
• FDI firms pay higher wages than domestic firms.
• FDI firms spend more on labor education than domestic firms.
• FDI firms spend more on R&D than domestic firms.
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• FDI firms are a greater competitor to domestic firms than what domestic firms are to FDI 
firms.
• FDI firms run more gender balanced operations than domestic firms.
These will all be tested one by one using the standard OLS regression shown in equation (1)
hypothesis specifc variable=firmownership dummies+control variables  (1)
The hypothesis specific variable vary between the six hypothesis; as it is the different above listed 
measures for the different hypothesis run one measure per regression. In contrast, the firm 
ownership dummies; one for FDI firms, one for private domestic firms, and one for government 
owned firms; and the control variables; industry, legal status, annual sales, amount of employees, 
age of the firm, skills of the top manager, geographic location, and the year it is in regard to; will 
remain the same for all regressions regarding the first set of sub-hypotheses. As such the dependent 
variable differ depending on hypothesis and the independent variable of interest is the ownership 
dummies.
When the preliminary regression was run did the Breusch-Pagan test show every single 
regression had an issue with heteroscedadicity, as shown in Appendix Table 2, which likely is a 
result of a difference in diversity between the different types of firms. Trying with the exchanging 
the test for the White test, running the test on a regression free from control variables, nor 
exchanging to running a preliminary regression using equation (2); an equation which is discussed 
later; gave the same result an indicated heteroscedadicity existed in all regressions. Further, running
the regressions using robust standard errors did not significantly change any of the results nor any 
of the uncertainties. However, all presented regressions are still done using robust standard errors, 
in case an issue would exist, but all have also been run without robust standard errors; even thouh 
not presented; without any difference in result.
Running each of the measures for the different hypotheses regarding the superiority of the 
FDI firms over domestic firms through equation (1) give the result which is shown in a simplified 
format in Table 1 in which the result of the regressions is shown and discussed for each hypothesis, 
for further detail of the result see Appendix Table 3 in which one of the firm ownership dummies 
always is omitted due to the way the regressions are calculated. As is clear in Table 1 did the 
measures of a variable in general agree in their result, even though some regressions gave 
inconclusive results. Further, it is clear three hypothesis have been empirically supported out of 
doubt, one has some but weak empirically support, one is empirically inconclusive, and the last 
have weak but still existing empirical suggestions the opposite to the hypothesis holds true. 
However, the R2 for the regressions vary between 0.038 and 0.22 meaning the regression do not fit 
all the data very well and there exists a great possibility of firms breaking the general result.
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Table 1: Result of regressing the first six sub-hypothesis.
Hypothesis Result
FDI firms have superior technology
usage to domestic firms
All regressions clearly showed FDI firms had superior
technology than both private and public domestic firms,
through better use of computers and through higher
productivity per worker.
FDI firms pay higher wages than
domestic firms
All regressions clearly showed FDI firms payed higher wages
per worker than both private and public domestic firms.
FDI firms spend more on labor
education than domestic firms
It is even within a 95% uncertainty interval more common for
FDI firms to offer formal training to their workers compared
to private and public domestic firms.
FDI firms spend more on R&D
than domestic firms
It is uncertain what type of firm invent most products and
technology, however FDI firms clearly spend more on R&D
than both private and public domestic firms.
FDI firms are a greater competitior
to domestic firms than vice versa
All seven measures are partly or fully inconclusive between
the three ownership types of firms. The only conclusive is
FDI firms have higher national market shares than public
domestic firms, have self-reported better technology than
private domestic firms, and have harder to access land
compared to public domestic firms.
FDI firms run more gender
balanced operations than domestic
firms
Inconclusive for all variables except percentage female
owners where it is clear FDI firms have, contrary to the
prediction, fewer women than both private and public
domestic firms and as such are less equal.
In order to test the empirical result, the five hypothesis with some empirical support or opposition 
gets one of their measures; the weighted labor measure in the cases of productivity and wages and 
the measure with most available data in the case of the other three; and get regressed one more time 
using the measures for the other hypothesis as control variables to find if this changes the result. 
However, due to lack of data regarding R&D expenditure in relation to the other measurements are 
R&D expenditures forced to be excluded from these regressions. The result, shown in detail in 
Appendix Table 4, is no change from the result shown in Table 1 with regard to FDI firms still 
offering more education to its workers but still having less equality. However, the result is more 
interesting in regard to FDI firms higher productivity and higher wages, which is 
when controlling for the other are these both inconclusive; id est FDI firms pay higher wages 
because they are more productive or alternative FDI firms are more productive because they pay 
higher wages. 
In conclusion, the only sub-hypothesis in this set which held without problem was “FDI 
firms spend more on labor education than domestic firms”. However, also “FDI firms have superior 
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technology usage to domestic firms” and “FDI firms pay higher wages than domestic firms” found 
empirical support but this support seemed to be interlinked suggesting one of them holds just 
because the other one holds. Also the sub-hypothesis “FDI firms spend more on R&D than domestic
firms” gained empirical support in finding FDI firms do in fact spend more than domestic firms. 
However, contradictory to this increased spending did FDI firms not seem to invent more than 
domestic firms; which either makes the R&D investment questionable investments, means domestic
firms are stealing the FDI firms inventions which a form of spillover, or shows the questions 
regarding whether new products and technology are flawed in they do not measure quality of the 
inventions. Finally, the “FDI firms are a greater competitor to domestic firms than vice versa” found
no support at all and surprisingly did regressions on data regarding “FDI firms run more gender 
balanced operations than domestic firms” show FDI firms seem to in fact be more male dominated 
than domestic firms. Hence, the first four sub-hypothesis in set two are therefore likely to find 
empirical support, while sub-hypothesis five is questionable, and the equality related sub-hypothesis
might find contrary support.
IV.IV. Empirical Testing of Set Two: The spillover effects
The second set also contains a total of six sub-hypothesis, each linked to a sub-hypothesis in set 
one, and these are:
• Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI use better technology due to spillover.
• Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI pay higher wages due to spillover.
• Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI spend more on educating their labor 
force due to spillover.
• Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI spend more on R&D due to spillover.
• Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI have a harder time on the input and 
final goods markets due to crowding-out competition.
• Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI have more gender equal operations 
due to spillover.
In order to test for possible spillover effects will an OLS regression of the type shown in equation 
(2) be used:
hypothesis specific variable for private domestic firms  = inward FDI  + control variables (2)
In it are the hypothesis specific variables, just as in the regressions for set one, the dependent 
variable and are all the above listed hypothesis measures, used one per regression. 
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Table 2: Result of regressing the second six sub-hypothesis
Hypothesis Result
Domestic firms in countries with
higher levels of FDI use better
technology
It is unclear how their productivity is affected, however it is
clear private domestic firms in countries with more FDI do,
in contrast to prediction, use computers less
Domestic firms in countries with
higher levels of FDI pay higher
wages
All the measures supports this idea within a 95% confidence
interval
Domestic firms in countries with
higher levels of FDI spend more on
educating their labor
Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI offer
fewer education opportunities, in contrast to theory.
Domestic firms in countries with
higher levels of FDI spend more on
R&D investments
Unclear whether domestic firms in countries with higher
levels of FDI spend more or less on R&D, but clear they
make fewer new products and technologies.
Domestic firms in countries with
higher levels of FDI have a harder
time on the input and final goods
markets due to crowding-out
competition.
Domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI have
lower national market shares and harder to access land, in
accordance with theory, but also have easier to access labor.
Domestic firms in countries with
higher levels of FDI have more
gender equal operations
The different measures on this hypothesis are either unclear
or contradict each other, hence it is not clear what the result is
However, in different from the regression to the first set of sub-hypotheses will only data from 
private domestic firms be used in the testing of spillovers, as it is to these firms FDI effects can 
spillover. The measures of inward FDI; which is taken from the WDI; is a measure of net inward 
FDI as a percentage of GDP and as such unfortunately contains both vertical and horizontal FDI. 
Finally, as before are the control variables industry, legal status, annual sales, amount of employees,
age of the firm, skills of the top manager, geographic location, and the year it is in regard to. As 
such, the dependent variable differ for each regression depending on the measure which is in use 
and the independent variable is the inward FDI. Also, in similarity to the regression of the first set 
are all presented regressions using robust standard errors as the issue still existed but once again 
without any changes in results.
The result of running the regressions; in detail showed in Appendix Tabel 5; is shown in 
Tabel 2 in a more simplified form, similar to Table 1. As seen do these hypotheses have a harder 
time finding empiric support, as only the wage spillovers seem to clearly exist while the other have 
more unclear results. Also the hypothesis regarding how private domestic firms have a harder time 
reaching the market if more FDI is in the country gets some support, since they get lower national 
share and harder to access land but contrary to the hypothesis get easier to access labor. The 
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hypothesis regarding technology usage, labor education, and R&D do have some inconclusive 
results but the results which are not are instead contradicting theory, hence the three hypothesis
should be rejected. Finally, the hypothesis regarding whether “domestic firms in countries with 
higher levels of FDI have more gender equal operations” reach contradictory results as some data 
from the old data set oppose this idea while some data from the new data set supports it. However, it
should be restated there is an issue with this regressions being done with cross-sectional data as the 
spillovers likely occurring over time. Further, the R2 were equally low in these regression, 
suggesting plenty of space for the firms to differ from the result shown.
A possible issue is the levels of FDI which have been used are the ones corresponding to the 
year in which the survies were conducted even though the FDI firms might take a few years to 
cause spillovers. However, including FDI data which is lagged one, two, and three years and using 
this both as the dependent variable and as control variables; in different regressions; do not change 
the result shown in Table 2 in any substantial way. The reason for this is likely because net inflow of
FDI seem to be a generally slowly changing value; as an investment is a big undertaking; and as 
such is the contemporary net inflow of FDI already capturing the lagged effects since the inflow 
today depend on what it was last year. The reason can also be because the dependent variable in all 
these cases remains stuck to a specific year thus is lagged variables not enough to find the effect.
Another issue with this regression is the use of cross-sectional data. The effects shown here
can be country specific to an extent greater than what the country related control variables can 
control for and therefore not show the effects of FDI but instead show the inflow of FDI is affected 
by something else which also affects the measures. However, five of the countries have data 
regarding all control variables and inward FDI for five different years each and can as such show 
how changes in FDI over time affect the different measures. However, as stated previously is it 
unclear if it is the same firms interviewed all five years, but these countries are still the closest to 
panel data this data set can come. Running regressions for firms only within these countries, 
country by country, in order to see if changes in FDI over time affects anything gives the result 
shown in Table 3. As shown, only twelve of the measures had data for all five countries and the 
result coming forth is all the way through contradictory to each other or just inconclusive. However,
Table 3 suggests the technique measurement “Website usage” should probably be positive instead of
negative as it was in the main regression and that the crowd-out measurement “Labor access 
obstacle” should indeed be negative; which means increase FDI leads to a decreased obstacle and 
which is in line with previous results but in contrast to predictions. Further, given wages was the 
only clear positive spillover found in Table 2 is it interesting one of the countries in Table 3 
experienced lower wages in domestic firms in years with higher levels of FDI. 
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Table 3: Result of regressing data country by country from five
consecutive years.
Variable Observations Range Result Within 95% Confidence Interval(Number of occurances of result)
E-mail usage 317 - 1'468 Positive(1), Inconclusive(3), Negative(1)
Website usage 317 - 1'464 Positive(3), Inconclusive(1), Negative(1)
Revenue per employee (1) 317 - 1'463 Positive(1), Inconclusive(3), Negative(1)
Revenue per employee (2) 317 - 1'459 Positive(1), Inconclusive(3), Negative(1)
Revenue per employee (3) 317 - 1'460 Positive(1), Inconclusive(3), Negative(1)
Wages (1) 300 - 1'216 Positive(2), Inconclusive(2), Negative(1)
Wages (2) 300 - 1'216 Positive(2), Inconclusive(2), Negative(1)
Wages (3) 300 - 1'216 Positive(2), Inconclusive(2), Negative(1)
Formal Training 228 - 1'274 Inconclusive(5)
Labour access obstacle 316 – 1'460 Positive(1), Inconclusive(1), Negative(3)
Land access obstacle 307 - 1'365 Positive(2), Negative(3)
Any female owner 316 - 1'467 Positive(1), Inconclusive(4)
The biggest conclusion which can be drawn from Table 3 is the question of spillovers is not straight 
forward, an increase of FDI in a country over time will not automatically result in higher computer 
usage, higher productivity, higher wages, more training opportunities for workers, changed access 
to inputs, or changed gender balances. Instead, many factors play into these changes and the 
influence of FDI firms on domestic firms can likely be both positive and negative depending on 
different circumstances, likely the reason why previous papers seem to disagree even within the 
same years and same country.
In short, positive spillovers were only found in terms of wages, since the main regression 
clearly showed domestic firms in countries with higher levels of inward FDI do pay higher wages; 
even though one of the five most survied countries experienced lower wages in domestic firms in 
years with higher levels of FDI. Most other correlations which were found were negative, 
suggesting possible negative spillovers; as domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI did
use  computers less, educated their labor less, put forward fewer new products, had lower market 
shares, and had harder to access land. However, it should be noted the negative correlation between 
FDI and market share as well as the negative correlation between FDI and land access were 
predicted in the hypothesis: “domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI have a harder 
time on the input and final goods markets due to crowding-out competition” which as such found 
support. In contrast, the same hypothesis was contradicted by it being easier for domestic firms in 
FDI heavy countries to find labor since FDI firms should be competitors on the labor market. 
Remaining measures were found to be inconclusive, or in the case of gender equality contradicting 
each other. As such, only the sub-hypothesis “domestic firms in countries with higher levels of FDI 
pay higher wages due to spillover” found greater empirical support while the hypothesis “domestic 
firms in countries with higher levels of FDI have a harder time on the input and final goods markets
due to crowding-out competition.” found limited support. The other sub-hypothesis were generally 
contradicted by the empiric result, with the exception of the equality hypothesis which found no 
reliable support for it nor any reliable results contradicting it.
IV.V. Empirical Testing Regarding How FDI Affects Growth
Using the same countries as previously and data from the World Bank Development Indicators 
(WB, 2015b) can a fixed effects panel data regression be used to test the impacts of FDI on growth 
over time. The years which are used are the 14 years 2000-2013; the reason why 2014 is left out is 
due to the FDI data for 2014 has yet not published; and as such a total of 126 times 14 data points; 
1'764; will be used in the regression which looks like equation (3).
Growth=inward FDI+  control variables (3)
In the regression is growth calculated as both the growth of GDP and the growth of GDP per capita 
and therefore will two separate regressions be needed. Inward FDI is, like for the spillover 
regressions, measured as net inward FDI as percentage of GDP. The control variables which will be 
used and measured are:
• Total GDP, since Brainard (1997) found this to be a factor which affects the inward FDI, 
since it seem to affect the firm decisions. This will be a continuous measure in constant 
2005 US$.
• GDP per capita, since it is unclear in Brainard (1997) whether it is the market size per se or 
the general wealth which really drives up inward FDI. This will be a continuous measure in 
constant 2005 US$.
• Dominant industry of the host country, since the benefits of engaging in FDI compared to 
exports likely vary depending on industry due to internal public goods, trade costs, and 
economies of scale. This will be measured in percentage of the country's GDP which comes 
from agriculture; ISIC divisions 1-5; and what percentage of the country's GDP comes from 
industry; ISIC division 10-45; both calculated in value added.
• Stability of the country, since a more dangerous and volatile country might be to unstable to 
operate in, while it also might be preferable to be present over just exporting if it is too 
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unstable due to the increased possibility to protect once goods. This is hard to measure but 
the WDI contains a 13 degrees “strength of legal rights index” which attempts to do this by 
measuring laws and the enforcement of them to see stability of the business environment.
As such with the use of these five measures for four different control variables do all parts of 
equation (3) have data and can therefore be run.
Running the fixed effects panel data regression gives the result shown in the first two rows 
of Table 4. In these two is it clear there is a positive correlation between growth and inward FDI for 
the less advanced economies included in the paper. Further, this result changes just marginally when
exchanging GDP growth for GDP per capita growth as both are almost equally positive. However, it
is also revealed only 1'109 of the 1'764 country-year combinations have sufficient data to be 
regressed. This means either a bottleneck exists or certain countries do not have data for all the 
fourteen years. Looking into this reveals a lot of countries have lacking data on certain years and 
not a single country have the stability index data for all the 14 years. This is solved by creating a set
of edited data from which the stability measure is removed and all countries who do not have data 
for all 14 years are also removed. The reason for doing this is there exists a risk the countries with 
incomplete data might skew the end result and this is therefore a possible precaution. The result of 
doing this is the amount of countries are reduced to 92 and the total amount of data points is 
therefore 1'288. However, as seen in the last two rows of Table 4 are all these 1'288 included in the 
regression and as such is the used data in fact increasing from the reduction. The result of regressing
the edited data, also shown in the last two rows of Table 4, is a still positive correlation between 
inward FDI and growth. This further supports the hypothesis of a positive relation between the two. 
Further, once again is there just a marginal difference between using GDP growth and GDP per 
capita growth. As such, it is clear there is a positive correlation between inward FDI and growth 
which in not due to skewed data, suggesting inward FDI might be able to cause economic growth, 
even though causality has not been proven.
To check whether the correlation between growth and inward FDI which was found is a 
more universal relation were the regressions done separately for each of the divisions of countries 
which were used as control variables for the regressions of equation (1) and (2), id est the divisions 
taken from United Nations Statistics Divisions (2013). The result is shown in Table 5; for more 
detail see Appendix Table 6; and it makes clear the result might not be universal. When using all the
unedited data did the Caribbean, Central America, North Africa, West Asia, South East Asia, and 
South Asia all support the previous found result while the other groups gave inconclusive results, 
the reason for which can come from a lack of data as the biggest regression only had 141 data 
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Table 4: Result of regressing the growth hypothesis
Regression Observations 95% confidence interval
All data, GDP growth 1'109 0.09 – 0.19
All data, GDP per capita growth 1'109 0.10 – 0.19
Edited data, GDP growth 1'288 0.08 – 0.17
Edited data, GDP per capita growth 1'288 0.08 – 0.17
Table 5: Result of regressing the growth hypothesis region by region
Data set Observations Range Result Within 95% Confidence Interval(Number of occurances of result)
All data 20 - 141 Positive(6), Inconclusive(10)
Edited data 28 - 154 Positive(2),Inconclusive(13),Negative(1)
points and the smallest was down on 20. However, when doing the regression on the edited data; 
which generally increased the amount of observations; did only the Caribbean and North Africa 
show positive correlations while Middle Africa even showed a negative correlation, suggesting 
either inward FDI can under certain circumstances have a negative impact on growth or both inward
FDI and growth are driven by common reasons and inward FDI do therefore not cause growth but 
occur together for other reasons.
These regressions have therefore found there internationally for less advanced countries do 
exist a correlation between inward FDI and growth over time, which do suggests inward FDI could 
cause growth. However, by regressing this for different regions separately was it found this is not 
necessarily a universal correlation as many regions show inconclusive results and Middle Africa 
with edited data even shows a negative correlation. This suggests the international result is either 
correlation without any causation or suggesting inward FDI under certain circumstances can have 
no impact or even a negative impact on growth.
V. Analysis and Discussion
It was possible to empirically test all thirteen hypothesis. However, only seven of the thirteen were 
supported by the empiric results, two had inconclusive results, and four had to be rejected due to the
results. As such, the hypothesis suggested can partly be seen as successful and the rejection of a few
of them do not mean the main hypothesis should be rejected. However, it should be kept in mind all 
results are coming with uncertainty as survey data can contain untruthful answers , as errors can 
exist in the regressions, and as the spillover hypotheses had better been answered through the use of
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panel data as there now might exist an endogenity problem; but no such data is available on this 
scale. Also, in both the spillover result and in the growth effect result is only correlation shown and 
not causation, meaning the interpretation of the data might be contrary to reality. Further, even 
though the result to an extent can help show whether or not the sub-hypothesis holds true are none 
of them fully answering the main hypothesis. Hence, an analysis and discussion of the result is 
needed in order to combine the results from the sub-hypotheses in order to reach a conclusion 
regarding the main hypothesis.
The first set of sub-hypothesis; regarding the superiority of FDI firms; showed FDI firms do 
use technology more effectively, pay higher wages, educate their work force more, and do spend 
more on R&D than domestic firms. However, it was shown the reason why they pay higher wages 
is because they are more productive; due to better use of technology; or possibly vice verse; which 
would make sense under the theory of efficiency wages. Further, even though they do spend more 
on R&D are they not more innovative measured in quantity compared to domestic firms, suggesting
they either are wasting money in their R&D, domestic firms benefit equally from their R&D 
investments; which would hint toward spillovers; or there being an issue with the measurement. 
Other results was also found suggesting FDI firms, contrary to predictions, are in many aspects not 
a bigger competitor to domestic firms than vice verse. Further, it was found FDI firms; despite 
likely coming from countries which generally rank high in gender equality; have less gender equal 
structures than domestic firms, which is highly surprising and contradicting the predictions. This 
means there is a risk for a negative spillover in which FDI firms from advanced economies spread 
inequality in less advanced countries. However, in total are FDI firms likely benefiting the host 
country through their presence since they provide the host country with more effective production, 
higher wages, and more investments which all can help to make the country grow. However, the 
gender imbalance in the FDI firms can in the long run be an issue, specially if it causes spillover 
effects to the rest of the society in the host country as inequality is damaging growth (Kabeer & 
Natali, 2013) by resulting in a sub-optimal use of the work force. The host country is also more 
likely to get spillovers if the FDI firms indeed are clearly better than the domestic firms, as only a 
better firm can be an inspiration and a leader.
The regressions regarding possible spillovers gave a more dreary outcome as the only 
possible spillover which was hypothesized and which found any support was a spillover in terms of 
wages, id est it is possible increased inward FDI results in increased wages in private domestic 
companies. Many other variables had instead negative correlations showing a negative impact on 
the domestic firms of the presence of the FDI firms; such as private domestic firms in countries 
with higher levels of FDI uses computers less, educate their labor less, innovate less, and had it 
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harder to access land for their production. These four factors together with the negatively correlated 
market access; private domestic firms in countries with higher levels of inward FDI have lower 
national market share; can all be signs of the crowd-out effect. This since if the FDI firms take over 
the most advanced and productive industries; which the industry control variable cannot control for;
will the private domestic firms either be pushed to industries which uses computers, innovation, and
labor education less or they will find themselves with a lack of land a low market share. As such, an
effect of increasing the amount of FDI on the host country can be to compete and crowd the local 
industries out of business. However, domestic firms spend less on educating their workers might not
be a bad thing as it combined with the positive result of a positive correlation between inward FDI 
and the domestic firms access to labor suggests FDI firms might educate the country's workforce so 
well the domestic firms do not have to. As such, a second spillover; this time in terms of an 
improved workforce, might have support in the results of the regressions. Another positive result 
was no clear correlation between FDI and gender equality was found, this means even though the 
FDI firms turned out to be less equal than the domestic firms are they not seeming to drag down 
equality in the rest of society and the potential harms of inequality are therefore less likely to show 
in the host country. Therefore, FDI firms seem to generally be great for the work force by possibly 
increasing the wages and maybe by increasing the level of education. However, evidence was found
suggesting inward FDI not necessarily being good for the private domestic firms as they get 
crowded-out by the increased competitions from more efficient firms. Hence, the over all spillover 
effect on the host country of FDI firms have both positive and negative sides making the combined 
effect of the two unclear.
The last regressions were regarding whether there is a positive correlation between inward 
FDI and economic growth. The result was on an international level is there indeed a positive 
correlation between the two. This suggests there is a possibility of FDI causing growth in the host 
country, even though it also is possible countries with higher growth simply attracts more FDI. This 
would mean the previous suggestions of FDI firms being superior and possibly causing increased 
wages and increased labor skills would outweigh the negative effects of FDI firms crowding out the
domestic firms; at least for now. In the opposite direction, the previous suggestions show how 
inward FDI possibly could cause economic growth which means the result do not contradict what 
could be expected. However, the result was not universal as when the regressions were run 
separately for different geographical regions did regressions using all the data only show a positive 
correlation for six of the sixteen regions; the remaining being inconclusive; and regressions using an
edited data set showed positive correlations for two regions and interestingly a negative correlation 
for one region. Many regions having inconclusive results is in itself not an issue as this can be due 
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to data problems in these regressions, specially since just a few data points were used for many 
regions. However, one country showing a negative correlation is a greater enigma as this suggests in
this region might FDI have been harmful to the economic growth. A reason for why this might be 
can however be found in knowing the region which showed a negative correlation was Middle 
Africa. This region is, according to the used GDP data, among the poorest regions together with 
West Africa and East Africa; while the six regions which had positive results all were clearly richer. 
Further, according to The Economist's Social Unrest Indicator (2010) is this region also among the 
most unstable regions in the world, far more unstable than the regions which showed a positive 
correlation, which is not surprising as for example The Democratic Republic of Congo under a long
period had many of their private domestic firms run by local warlords (Doyle, 2014). Therefore, 
Middle Africa being the region showing the negative correlation between inward FDI and growth 
supports the idea of countries being effected differently by FDI depending on their ability to absorb 
it; as has been suggested by Damijan & al. (2008); which can depend upon Middle Africa likely 
having poorly developed financial markets; as suggested to be a factor by Azman-Saini & al. 
(2010); as well as other issues in the region. Hence, these regressions generally found a positive 
relation between inward FDI and growth, suggesting FDI might be positive for the host country in it
might cause economic growth. However, features of the host country can determine how great the 
country's experience with FDI will be.
The results of testing the hypothesis was at certain times surprising or confusing but the 
analyze of it clarified and showed five main aspects of the impact of FDI on the host country can 
find support in the results despite no clear causation being possible to find, these are:
• FDI firms are more efficient than domestic firms and can therefore contribute to the host 
country by providing better production as well as higher wages which both can help to 
generate growth.
• FDI might be beneficial for the people of the host country by increasing the level of 
education and by increasing the wages even for the people working in domestic firms.
• FDI could possibly hurt the local industry by crowding it out, this can in the long run be 
harmful in case the FDI would decrease and foreign firms would start to pull out.
• FDI is generally positively correlated to growth, suggesting it might cause it which is a clear
positive FDI could have on developing host countries.
• The effects of FDI likely depend upon features of the host country, meaning the effects and 
therefore the use of FDI might differ for different countries.
From these five can a general picture be seen in which FDI potentially causes growth and prosperity
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in most host countries and as such could FDI attracting policies be a good investment for 
developing countries. The growth coming from the FDI firms increasing the average productivity, 
increasing the wages, and possibly also educating the population. However, FDI can in the long run 
be dangerous by out competing local industries and might not be as positive for all host countries, 
which means the policies has to be implemented with caution and policies to support the local 
industries could be a good complement to the FDI attraction policies. Despite this, the main 
hypothesis of FDI generally being positive for the host country is thereby generally supported.
VI. Conclusion
Over the past decades has the world seen a rapid increase in FDI at the same time as an increasing 
amount of developing countries are implementing special policies to attract even more FDI. This 
means weak economies in the world have tried hard to tap in to the growing international flows of 
investments, likely in hope of it benefiting from them economically as a country. Despite this is it 
yet not clear what the greater effects of FDI are on developing countries. However, this paper 
hopefully came closer to revealing how the developing countries are affected by their FDI attraction
policies.
The effects which FDI was found to have on the host country were both positive and 
negative. Positive was, they contributed to the developing country by bringing their superior 
technology, wages, methods, and research; which likely results in a higher productivity in the 
country; as well as by being superior to the domestic firms makes the domestic firms pay higher 
wages which resulted in an overall higher wage level. However, the negative side was these 
superior firms seem to cause such competition to the domestic firms they threat to in the long run 
wreck the domestic industry in the host country. Negative was also they, surprisingly, were less 
equal than domestic firms; something which however did not seem to rub of on the rest of the 
society and therefore hopefully does not do great harm. Despite this big negative effects was the 
overall effects still likely positive given a positive correlation between economic growth and inward
FDI was found. However, there is a possibility the effects do differ depending on the features of the 
country in question as well as there is a risk the negative effects have a greater long term impact 
than the positive effects, as the crowd out effects can destroy the domestic industry. Hence, 
countries which do implement FDI attraction policies will not all necessarily experience the positive
effects found in the paper and in the future might we start seeing a down side to these policies if the 
FDI flows would start to dry up.
The developing countries which do try to attract more FDI are due to the effects found in 
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this paper likely applying a smart development strategy as FDI in these countries seem to be able to 
help them grow. However, these should be done with caution as attracting FDI is not a sure way to 
reach the goals of growth as characteristics of the society might alter the experience the country has 
with FDI and since even if the direct effects of attracting FDI might be positive for the country's 
economy might there be harmful long term effects as the FDI firms can out compete the domestic 
industry. As such, FDI attracting policies can possibly with good results be paired with policies 
intended to strengthen the society; for example by improving the financial markets; which would 
improve the chances of having good effects and policies intended to strengthen the domestic 
industry; so it does not get crowded out and so the country do not depend on foreign firms to 
flourish. 
Caution should also be in these policies since the research on the topic is far from over. 
Further research could specially benefit from collecting data which allows a greater time aspect 
while maintain the firm level analysis with as many countries as possible. This since the long run 
effects of FDI presented here are based upon assumptions and theory and could need support from 
panel data regressions. Moreover, future research could also include the aspect of greenfield FDI 
compared to M&A FDI. This since it has in previous papers been indicated to have some 
differences in effect and also can be attractive with different policies, but due to data limitation was 
not possible to include in this paper.
In sum, this paper has found the FDI attracting policies are, as hypothesized, overall positive
for the developing country which implements them, by providing better firms who are leaders on 
the labor market and who might cause economic growth. However, it also finds there might be 
differences in how positive it is to attract FDI depending on the country. Even worse, it do find 
these policies might have long run harms as they can hurt the domestic industry. As such, the FDI 
attracting policies which are implemented by many of the worlds weakest economies do look very 
attractive as a boost to the economy, but if they are not implemented with caution might these 
already weak countries grow even poorer.
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Appendix
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the data for all data used in the empiric testing 
of the two big sets of sub-hypothesis.
Measure Observations Mean StandardDeviation Range
E-mail usage 127'454 0.66 0.47 0 or 1 (no or yes)
Website usage 126'952 0.42 0.49 0 or 1 (no or yes
Revenue per
employee (1) 111'224 2.5*10
6 9.7*107 0 – 2.7*1010
Revenue per
employee (2) 99'341 2.1*10
6 9.8*107 0 – 2.7*1010
Revenue per
employee (3) 99'341 2.1*10
6 9.8*107 0 – 2.7*1010
Wages (1) 100'293 2.3*105 1.1*107 0 – 3.3*109
Wages (2) 91'974 1.8*105 9.0*106 0 – 2.6*109
Wages (3) 91'974 1.9*105 9.1*106 0 – 2.6*109
Formal Training 110'903 0.40 0.49 0 or 1 (no or yes)
New Product 29'962 0.40 0.49 0 or 1 (no or yes)
Improved Product 31'588 0.57 0.49 0 or 1 (no or yes)
New Technology 32'298 0.36 0.48 0 or 1 (no or yes)
R&D expenditure 22'501 7.5*105 2.6*107 0 – 2.8*109
Local Share 6'677 27% 29% 0% - 100%
National Share 15'523 22% 29% 0% - 100%
Technology
compared to
competitors
11'183 2.1 0.65
1, 2, or 3
(less, equal, or
more advanced)
Average years of
education of
workers, old data
21'420 2.6 0.92
1, 2, 3, or 4
(0-5, 6-9, 10-12, 
or over 12)
Average years of
education of
workers, new data
14'311 2.9 0.96
1, 2, 3, 4, or 5
(0-3, 4-6, 7-9, 
10-12, or over 12)
Labour access
obstacle 127'487 1.3 1.3
0, 1, 2, 3, or 4
(no, minor,
moderate, major,
or very severe)
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Variable Observations Mean StandardDeviation Range
Land access
obstacle 126'191 1.0 1.3
0, 1, 2, 3, or 4
(no, minor,
moderate, major,
or very severe)
Percentage female
top manager 8'288 21% 30% 0% - 100%
Percentage female
in total workforce 24'275 28% 29% 0% - 100%
Percentage female
managers 12'063 20% 30% 0% - 100%
Percentage female
professionals 12'021 23% 31% 0% - 100%
Percentage female
skilled production
workers, old data
18'293 24% 33% 0% - 100%
Percentage female
un-skilled
production
workers, old data
16'214 27% 34% 0% - 100%
Percentage female
non-production
workers
12'034 34% 36% 0% - 100%
Any female owner 86'609 0.32 0.46 0 or 1 (no or yes)
Percentage female
production
workers, new data
47'380 0.24% 0.32% 0%-8.5%
Percentage female
non-production
workers, new data
44'386 0.34% 0.42% 0%-25%
Industry 133'545 - - -
Legal Status 124'750 - - -
Annual Sales 113'326 1.8*108 1.5*1010 0 – 4.1*1012
Employment (1) 132'433 109 604 0 – 6.8*104
Employment (2) 116'857 122 755 1 – 8.0*104
Employment (3) 116'857 121 753 1 – 8.0*104
Firm Age 129'378 17 16 0 - 304
Manager
Experience 108'742 16 13 0 – 2001
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Table 2: Regression of the first set of sub-hypothesis without editing measures
Hypothesis Measure Observations
Breusch-
Pagan
Chi2
FDI firm
95%
confidence
interval
Private
domestic firm
95% confidence
interval
Government
firm 95%
confidence
interval
Technology
Usage
E-mail usage 82'846 4.97*103 0.12 – 0.19 0.00 – 0.07 omitted
Website usage 82'593 2.12*103 0.12 – 0.20 -0.03 – 0.04 omitted
Revenue per
employee (1) 83'905 1.65*10
7 -8.7*106 -
4.9*106
-9.3*106 -
4.6*106 omitted
Revenue per
employee (2) 83'905 1.97*10
7 -6.9*106 –
3.3*106
-7.3*106 –
3.1*106 omitted
Revenue per
employee (3) 83'905 1.95*10
7 -6.7*106  -
3.4*106
-7.2*106  -
3.1*106 omitted
Wages
Wages (1) 78'384 8.93*105 omitted -1.3*10
5  - 
1.3*105
-3.3*105 –
9.0*104
Wages (2) 78'384 1.03*106 omitted -1.0*10
5 –
1.2*105
-2.6*105 –
1.0*105
Wages (3) 78'384 1.00*106 omitted -1.1*10
5 –
1.2*105
-2.8*105 –
9.3*104
Labour
Education Formal Training 67'330 790 0.02 – 0.09 -0.11 - -0.04 omitted
R&D
New Product 5'978 91.5 omitted -0.07 – 0.03 -0.06 – 0.12
Improved
Product 6'765 7.13 omitted -0.03 – 0.04 -0.07 – 0.05
New
Technology 6'934 250 omitted -0.03 – 0.05 -0.06 – 0.07
R&D
expenditure 6'107 1.2*10
5 -1.6*106 –
1.5*107
-4.6*105 –
4.7*106 omitted
Level of
Competition
Local Share 2'170 80.5 -15 - 15 -11 - 18 omitted
National Share 4'890 783 -1.2 – 8.1 -1.9 – 6.0 omitted
Technology
compared to
competitors
2'935 6.36 omitted -0.26 – -0.07 -0.26 – 0.30
Average years
of  education of
workers, old
data
4'679 64.1 0.03 – 0.30 -0.14 – 0.09 omitted
Average years
of  education of
workers, new
data
13'071 0.21 -0.33 – 0.12 -0.45 - -0.01 omitted
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Hypothesis Measure Observations
Breusch-
Pagan
Chi2
FDI firm
95%
confidence
interval
Private
domestic firm
95% confidence
interval
Government
firm 95%
confidence
interval
Level of
Competition
Labour access
obstacle 83'149 592 -0.12 – 0.06 -0.18 - -0.01 omitted
Land access
obstacle 81'536 1.57*10
3 0.02 – 0.20 0.11 – 0.29 omitted
Gender
Equality
Percentage
female top
manager
2'432 172 omitted -1.09 – 7.42 -4.78 – 15.4
Percentage
female in total
workforce
7'657 400 omitted -2.16 – 1.32 -3.04 – 2.51
Percentage
female
managers
4'027 406 omitted -2.74 – 3.01 -3.34 – 8.18
Percentage
female
professionals
4'525 377 omitted -1.47 – 3.68 -3.84 – 5.62
Percentage
female skilled
production
workers
5'484 560 -7.02 – 1.93 -4.46 – 3.64 omitted
Percentage
female 
un-skilled
production
workers
4'795 441 omitted 0.22 – 5.75 -4.99 – 5.33
Percentage
female 
non-production
workers,
old data
3'659 175 omitted -4.52 – 2.60 -7.85 – 2.83
Any female
owner 70'761 2.54*10
3 omitted 0.13 – 0.15 0.13 – 0.22
Percentage
female
production
workers
40'054 3.31*103 -0.07 – 0.00 -0.06 – 0.01 omitted
Percentage
female 
non-production
workers, 
new data
37'487 2.34*103 -0.09 - -0.02 -0.08 - -0.01 omitted
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 Table 3: Regression of the first six sub-hypothesis
Hypothesis Measure Observations R2
FDI firm 95%
confidence
interval
Private
domestic firm
95% confidence
interval
Government
firm 95%
confidence
interval
Technology
Usage
E-mail usage 82'846 0.22 0.11 – 0.18 0.01 – 0.07 omitted
Website usage 82'593 0.17 0.13 – 0.20 -0.01 – 0.06 omitted
Revenue per
employee (1) 83'149 0.085
1.2*105 -
4.4*105
-1.8*105  -
1.2*105 omitted
Revenue per
employee (2) 83'145 0.083
1.0*105 –
3.6*105
-1.4*105 –
1.0*105 omitted
Revenue per
employee (3) 83'155 0.086 omitted
-3.1*105  -
-2.1*105
-3.6*105 -
-9.5*104
Wages
Wages (1) 77'413 0.043 omitted -2.2*10
4  - 
-1.1*104
-4.1*104 –
-8.6*103
Wages (2) 77'455 0.046 omitted -2.2*10
4 –
-1.1*104
-4.0*104 –
-1.1*104
Wages (3) 77'456 0.046 omitted -2.1*10
4 –
-1.0*104
-4.0*104 –
-1.1*104
Labor
Education
Formal
Training 67'330 0.14 0.05 – 0.12 -0.09 - -0.02 omitted
R&D
New Product 5'978 0.091 omitted -0.08 – 0.01 -0.07 – 0.09
Improved
Product 6'765 0.20 omitted -0.05 – 0.03 -0.08 – 0.04
New
Technology 6'934 0.078 omitted -0.04 – 0.04 -0.03 – 0.09
R&D
expenditure 6'051 0.050 omitted
-1.1*105 –
-4.3*104
-2.3*105 -
-1.3*105
Level of
Competition
Local Share 2'170 0.056 -11 - 14 -7 - 16 omitted
National Share 4'890 0.15 3 – 12 3 – 11 omitted
Technology
compared to
competitors
2'935 0.052 omitted -0.28 – -0.10 -0.20 – 0.32
Average years
of education of
workers, old
data
4'679 0.15 0.15 – 0.46 -0.05 – 0.21 omitted
Average years
of  education
of workers,
new data
13'071 0.16 -0.37 – 0.12 -0.50 - -0.03 omitted
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Hypothesis Measure Observations R2
FDI firm 95%
confidence
interval
Private
domestic firm
95% confidence
interval
Government
firm 95%
confidence
interval
Level of
Competition
Labour access
obstacle 83'149 0.087 -0.08 – 0.10 -0.16 - 0.00 omitted
Land access
obstacle 81'536 0.038 0.02 – 0.21 0.09 – 0.27 omitted
Gender
Equality
Percentage
female top
manager
2'432 0.070 omitted -0.7 – 9.1 -8.0 – 14
Percentage
female in total
workforce
7'657 0.12 omitted -1.4 – 2.8 -0.3 – 6.2
Percentage
female
managers
4'027 0.065 omitted -2.46 – 4.3 -4.5 – 7.9
Percentage
female
professionals
4'525 0.068 omitted -1.6 – 4.1 -1.6 – 8.2
Percentage
female skilled
production
workers
5'484 0.075 -8.8 – 1.2 -4.1 – 4.5 omitted
Percentage
female un-
skilled
production
workers
4'795 0.090 omitted 1.6 – 8.2 -0.4 – 11
Percentage
female
non-production
workers,
old data
3'659 0.11 omitted -4.8 – 2.9 -9.3 – 2.9
Any female
owner 70'761 0079 omitted 0.12 – 0.15 0.14 – 0.24
Percentage
female
production
workers
40'054 0.092 -0.10 – 0.02 -0.05 – 0.03 omitted
Percentage
female
non-production
workers, new
data
37'487 0.095 -0.11 - 0.03 -0.09 - 0.03 omitted
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Table 4: Result of regressing the interesting measures from the first six
sub-hypothesis using the other of them as control variables.
Hypothesis Measure Observations
FDI firm 95%
confidence
interval
Private
domestic firm
95% confidence
interval
Government
firm 95%
confidence
interval
Technology Usage Revenue peremployee (3)
51'489
-1.9*105 –
6.1*104
-3.0*105 –
-6.1*104
omittedWages Wages (3)
-6.4*103 –
2.6*104
-1.5*103 –
3.0*104
Training Formal Training 2.9*10-3 – 0.11 -0.14 - -0.04
Gender Equality Any female owner -0.25 - -0.14 -0.11 - -0.01
Table 5: Regression of the second six sub-hypothesis
Hypothesis Measure Observations R2 95% confidenceinterval
Technology Usage
E-mail usage 66'770 0.25 -3.4*10-3 - -1.4*10-3
Website usage 66'523 0.19 -6.1*10-3 - -3.9*10-3
Revenue per employee (1) 66'834 0.10 -3300 - 7500
Revenue per employee (2) 66'831 0.098 -3100 - 5800
Revenue per employee (3) 66'843 0.10 -4400 - 4800
Wages
Wages (1) 61'896 0.041 1300 - 2400
Wages (2) 61'930 0.043 830 - 1800
Wages (3) 61'934 0.044 770 - 1800
Training Formal Training 52'523 0.14 -5.8*10-3 - -3.2*10-3
R&D
New Product 5'249 0.091 -0.018 - -0.013
Improved Product 5'727 0.21 -0.017 - -2.0*10-3
New Technology 5'873 0.082 -0.017 - -1.8*10-3
R&D expenditure 5'187 0.030 -7400 - 5000
Competition
Local Share 1'973 0.058 -1.0 – 1.3
National Share 4'112 0.16 -3.1 - -1.7
Average years of  education
of workers, old data 4'102 0.15 -0.079 - -0.036
Average years of  education
of workers, new data 11'801 0.16 0.029 – 0.041
Labour access obstacle 66'870 0.093 -7.2*10-3 – -1.1*10-3
Land access obstacle 65'495 0.048 1.3*10-3 – 7.6*10-3
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Hypothesis Measure Observations R2 95% confidenceinterval
Gender Equality
Percentage female top
manager 2'163 0.070 -1.4 – 0.93
Percentage female in total
workforce 6'489 0.11 -1.8 - -0.89
Percentage female managers 3'476 0.066 -1.5 - -0.063
Percentage female
professionals 3'849 0.081 -2.5 - -1.3
Percentage female skilled
production workers 4'750 0.073 -2.1 – -0.95
Percentage female un-skilled
production workers 4'167 0.086 -2.3 - -0.99
Percentage female
non-production workers,
old data
3'092 0.11 -1.6 – 0.11
Any female owner 56'561 0.060 -8.6*10-4 – 1.6*10-3 
Percentage female
production workers 30'730 0.057 2.2*10
-3 – 4.9*10-3
Percentage female
non-production workers, 
new data
28'338 0.080 3.6*10-3 – 7.1*10-3
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Table 6: Regression of the growth hypothesis region by region
Data, Region Observations 95% confidence interval
All data, Carribea 82 0.16 – 0.62
All data, Central America 78 0.05 – 0.58
All data, Central Asia 39 -0.20 – 0.46
All data, East Africa 129 -0.11 – 0.15
All data, East Asia 20 -0.03 – 0.62
All data, East Europe 40 -0.41 – 1.02
All data, Middle Africa 67 -0.47 – 0.02
All data, North Africa 50 0.04 – 1.07
All data, Oceania 36 -0.33 – 0.21
All data, South East Asia 78 0.14 – 0.89
All data, Southern Africa 46 -0.79 – 0.08
All data, South America 100 -0.12 – 0.65
All data, South Asia 70 0.05 – 1.64
All data, South Europe 57 -0.20 – 0.20
All data, West Africa 141 -0.07 – 0.10
All data, West Asia 76 0.18 – 0.69
Edited data, Carribean 126 0.14 – 0.49
Edited data, Central America 84 -0.48 – 0.09
Edited data, Central Asia 56 -0.12 – 0.39
Edited data, East Africa 154 -0.10 – 0.12
Edited data, East Asia 28 -0.05 – 0.31
Edited data, East Europe 56 -0.56 – 0.61
Edited data, Middle Africa 70 -0.32 - -0.01
Edited data, North Africa 70 0.12 – 0.83
Edited data, Oceania 28 -0.47 – 0.48
Edited data, South East Asia 98 -0.04 – 0.46
Edited data, Southern Africa 42 -0.33 – 0.34
Edited data, South America 126 -0.09 – 0.39
Edited data, South Asia 70 -0.56 – 0.85
Edited data, South Europe 56 -0.01 – 0.57
Edited data, West Africa 154 -0.10 – 0.15
Edited data, West Asia 70 -0.05 – 0.34
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